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it is free from state sales tax Undei%.the import-export Isic] .,clause of ithe
United States if at-the time title passed the certainty' of the foreign desti-
nation was plain:"° The 'validity of this statement; is even ,more :dubious
in light of the'repeated assertions of the Supreme Court that the intent to
export does 'not make articles. exports. 1° . • • •.' •;•
Of course, the Supreme Court has denied' certiorari, but that ',fact is
not indicative of any change 'of doctrine On-the:part of the. Couit." In
any event, the problem in• the'.instant case could easily have been avoided.
If title to the 'goods had not passed• from the manufacturer..to' the purchaser
at the time they were delivered-to the packer,' but had. been retainedr:by the
seller until delivery to the ocean carrier, the - transaction 'would !clearlY., not
have been subject to the state sales. tax because .the act sought to': bettaxed
would then be the act committing the goods to export." Less• clear,' how-
ever, is'the tax 'position.of. the seller who turns over-title under the'lcontract
at the • time of delivery of the goods to a , dOmesticiCarrier: foi.;transshipment
to 'the • ocean' carrier. Hughes' Bros. Timber Co. V. .Minnesota, 3. held under
the' Comtherce Clause, that ,an.ad , valorem, propertyaax may not be -levied
by the state while the goods were in .transit, but prior to their: having been
received•.by the interstate , carrier. While .goods in 'foreign commerce have
been recognized as being entitled to greater immunity 'from taxation under
Art. I, § 9, cl:' 5 and'Ait. I; § 10, cl. '2, than goods in interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause, 14 the Supreme.Court - has irrErnpresa 'left open
the 'extent -of the applicability 'of 'the Hughes. rule. vto foreign , commerce
situations.
PETER A. DONOVAN
t: r	 • Student Editor-in-Chief'
	
•i,• •	 i	 ,•
ConstitUtional LaNir—Off-Street Parking PrOvisitin in Municipal Zoning
Ordinance Held Invilid'A's a rielegation Of Legislative Power.-State
ix rel. Associated' Lauri
,
 and Investment'Cokp. Citit bf Lynel-
hurst.1—Mandownr brought an action for ma.' ndainus in the OhiO Coitrt of
Appeals to compel' a building inspector to issue a permit for the alteration of
an office building. The inspector had preViously denied the perrnit because
of non-compliance with,off-street parking proVisions in the loCal zoning ordi-
nance. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and, on appeal, the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed. HELD: Provisions of the zoning ordinance which
(1) required that all buildings other ,than dwellings have off-street parking
0 51 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 336 P.2d 161, 163.
10 See cases note 6 supra.	 .	 .
11 See separate opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912 (1950). •
12 Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923). 	 ,
13 272 U.S. 469 (1926).	 • 	 ,
14 See Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901) ; United States v. Hvoslef,
237 U.S. 1 (1914) ; and Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S 19 (1914).
1 154 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio St. 1958).
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• CASE NOTES
space "reasonably' 'adequate" for commercial vehicles necessary to carry
on the. business of the occupants of the premises and (2) required that all
buildings , other than dwellings, churches, theatres, assembly halls, retail
stores, have parking space for the "normal volume" of car parking by
persons 'coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof,
were ,
 unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power without sufficient
criteria to' - guide the administrative officer in the, exercise of his discretion?
The portion of the decision which strikes down the invalid provisions, based
on the doctrine of iseparation of powers, is in accord with well established
law,8
 and graphically illustrates one of the barriers facing' those who seek
to incorporate off:street parking requirements for commercial buildings into
zoning lavis. •	 •	 ,
'Since 'measures to alleviate increasing traffic congestion in urban areas
are' clearly directed toward the' public welfare, the insertion of • off-street
parking krequirements in zoning laws is a valid exercise of polices power.4
Although in practice such 'pa:I-king provisions , are not yet universally in-
cluded in. zoning 'Ordinances,: a• substantial.number 1 , of communities have
enacted some requirements .P Because.,of the nature of certain land uses
within a zoning' plan, 'there are available convenient factors which in par-
ticular situations may be utilized in legislation to provide sufficiently definite
criteria to channel the discretion of those administering the plan. An exam-
ple of this may be seen in the instant ordinance. Parking facilities required
for inhabitants of dwellings were measured by the number of dwelling
units; .facilities for patrons ,of .churches,. theatres, and,•assembly halls were
measured by the seating capacity; facilities • for customers of banks and re-,
tail stores were measured by, the available floor space above a certain 'mini-
mum; .all other buildings were ,required to'proyide space in relation to the
number of 'employees. These provisions were held , valid since there . was. a
reasonable. measuring unit provided to ascertain. the amount of ,parking
space required ,by the ordinance; 6 but the regulations, as to loading .and
unloading facilities for commercial vehicles and facilities for cars of persons
coming to structures, such as office buildings, for business purposes, pro-
vided no criteria. The ordinance simply designates 'treasonable and ade-
quate" and "the normal volume of car parking", as standards, leaving the
final determination to the unguided discretion of the administrator.' The
requirement of space for commercial vehicles, applicable to all premises
other than dwellings, and the requirement, for cars of persons coming to
the premises on business, applicable to all structures other . than dwellings,
churches, theatres, assembly halls, retail stores, both lacked a measuring
factor such as was found in the valid parts of the ordinance. ,
2 Id. at 441.
8 State ex ref. `Synod of Ohio v. JOseph, 139 Ohio St.' 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942) ;
Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958) ; .37 Am. Jur. Municipal Cor-
porations § 160 (1941).
4 State ex rel. Associated Land and Investment Corp., supra note 1, at 440; See 2
Yorkley, Zoning Law and Practice, § 210 (2d ed. 1953).
5 2 Yorkley § 208.
a State ex rel. Associated Land and Investment Corp., supra note 1, at 440.
7 Id. at 441.
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The problem of providing adequate criteria for situations such as those
involved in the invalid parts of the instant ordinance seems to border on
the impossible since any formula relating off-street parking requirements to
land uses must be sufficiently general to be applicable to diverse businesses
and yet sufficiently specific to meet the needs of the particular business
occupying the premises. The amount of traffic to two physically similar office
buildings, for example, may vary greatly because of the particular nature
of the business carried on within each building. This may also be true
of the traffic of commercial vehicles to different buildings. Possibly one
method, in the case of alterations to and expansions of existing buildings,
would be to require an estimate • of future traffic to the building based on
an average of the present flow of traffic multiplied by a ratio of presently
available floor space to future floor space, or some other similar mathe-
matical comparing factor. Entirely new buildings would have to be com-
pared to similar enterprises under like conditions. The difficulties of writing
such formulae into zoning ordinances effectively is obvious; however, mathe-
matical accuracy is not required, 8 and the parking provision would probably
be upheld, if there were at least some workable formula, not palpably un-
reasonable or illogical, by which the discretion of the- administrator might
be guided.
LAWRENCE J. KENNEY
Corporations—Executive Compensation—Deferred Compensation Unit
Plans.—Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc. 1—A corporate stockholder sued
to enjoin the continued operation of a "Deferred Compensation Unit Plan,"
on the ground that the capital gains provision of the plan was not reasonably
related to the value of the services rendered by those included within it.
Upon the death or retirement of a key executive, there was to be credited
to his "unit account" an amount equal to the net increment in market
value of one share of common stock, from the date the "units" were assigned,
multiplied by the number of "units" assigned. Payment of the amount was
to be made over a ten-year period following the executive's death or re-
tirement. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery,
New Castle, Delaware, held for the defendant; it cannot be said that ap-
preciation of the market price of common stock is unrelated to the efforts
of the individuals included within the plan.
Berkwitz v. Humphrey 2 is the only other case which has been litigated
testing the validity of the so-called "unit" plans. It was concluded there
that a plan, almost identical to the one in question, was per se invalid. It
was reasoned that, since the market price of common stock is subject to
many extraneous forces, i.e., fortunes of the economy, speculation, etc., there
8 Ibid. The Court allowed the approximate determination of the number of em-
ployees by a consideration of the floor space, the number of offices, and the purposes
for which the building was constructed.
Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc., 149 A.2d 756 (Del. Ch. 1959).
2 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio, 1958).
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